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Abstract. Industry is continuously developing, deploying, and main-
taining e-services to transform traditional offerings. While protection of
traditional services is well understood, their digital transformation often
is vulnerable to known and new attacks. These vulnerabilities open the
door for fraudsters to exploit the weaknesses of the new systems and as-
sociated services, causing losses of billions of dollars for global economy.
This development is caused by the ease of developing new offerings, and
the difficulty of performing thorough risk assessment during their de-
sign and development. Traditional risk assessment methodologies need
to be enhanced to include threat scenarios faced by e-services, and to
enable them to match the short development timeframes and to inform
the decision-making process. In this paper we present a fraud risk esti-
mation approach addresses these requirements. Based on a list of threat
scenarios, our approach calculates the potential risk using pre-computed
risk factors, and visualises the analysis result for an informed decision
making. In doing so, our approach increases visibility and awareness of
fraud risks, and reduces the time spent to calculate potential risks at
the design level and throughout development. Together, these properties
make our fraud risk estimation approach ideally suited for constantly
applied, iterative risk analysis.
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1 Introduction
Electronic services or e-services are an umbrella concept for services in different
areas utilising information and communication technologies, most prominently
the Internet. They are different from non-electronic services by their character-
istics of continuous improvement and deployment, transparent service feedback
and rapid development [13]. Examples include e-Government and e-Health, but
also traditional services are increasingly transformed into e-services across do-
mains and industries in the process of streamlining operations and easing inter-
action with both existing and novel services of organisations. Not surprisingly,
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the technological transformation in providing e-services has also led to a drastic
increase of attacks and fraudulent activities by cyber criminals.
According to a report, attacks on e-services produce an estimated loss of
$600 billion in 2017 alone [9]. One of the most important cyber crimes against
e-services is fraud, that is the use of services with no intention of payment [3],
and the misuse of services for individual or organised benefits [2]. Fraudulent at-
tacks often exploit weaknesses at the social, technical, and economical layer [12].
This could be avoided if stringent risk assessment would be applied continuously
when new or updated services are planned. However, the ease and speed of de-
veloping and deploying services today is diametrically opposed to the difficulty
of performing risk analysis.
A number of different security risk assessment methods are designed to iden-
tify and analyse different types of risks at a system level [15]. While the applica-
tion of these assessment methods generates a large number of threat scenarios,
there are at least three problems analysing the risk they pose. First, current ap-
proaches collect information about the threat predominantly by brainstorming
or doing expert interviews for further assessment [15]. This is often too time-
consuming a process, but especially so for e-services, considering their charac-
teristics and how little time it requires to release a new service to customers.
Second, an informed decision must be based on a calculation of the potential
risk based on relevant factors leading the threat scenario [8]. When these factors
are unavailable, decisions must be made based on incomplete inputs, and thus
will not be able to address potential risks against the service under assessment.
Third, a large number of threat scenarios could produce a corresponding large
number of risks to the service. The risks or their impact must be presented in
a human-readable format to support decision makers have informed decisions,
which requires tool support.
In this paper, we present Fraud Risk Estimation (FRE), an automated ap-
proach that addresses the issues identified above. Fraud Risk Estimation pre-
calculates impact, likelihood, and consequently risks of threats based on different
risk factors. The resulting risks are visualised, to enable analysts to understand
and identify the largest risks and contributing factors. The calculations are per-
formed for different risk factors depending on threat scenarios, and are visualised
to support the decision-making process.
Our approach includes a novel method to address missing or unreliable val-
ues, which are notoriously difficult to account for in established methods. We
introduce sliders inspired by tools for analysing MRI results, where doctors look
for discontinuities in large sets of pictures instead of individual pictures. Sliders
enable the analyst to quickly see the risks for differing values of variables and
the risks these values lead too.
Compared to traditional approaches, our approach has the advantage of as-
sessing the service in terms of expected risks, directing decision makers to the
parts of a service that must be addressed to reduce the potential risks, and
enabling continuous risk analysis throughout the development process.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After a discussion of related work
in Section 2, we discuss the relevant definitions used to design FRE including
threat scenarios, risk factors and risk metrics in Section 3. Then, Section 4
presents the proposed risk estimation approach, its architecture, the process
of estimating risk, and algorithms. Section 5 presents the tool we developed
for FRE, an application of the approach to a case study, and an experiment
on the performance of the prototype. Section 6 discusses the advantages and
weaknesses of the FRE approach, and Section 7 summarises the paper with
concluding remarks and a discussion of future work.
2 Related Work
An important part of cybersecurity frameworks and standards is Security Risk
Assessment (SRA). The NIST Cybersecurity framework [11] and ISO 27001 [7],
for example, provide guidelines to SRAs and how to identify, analyse, and esti-
mate security risks. They require design and implementation steps according to
the type of risks a system or a service encounters. We discuss some exemplary
approaches we thought have applicability for service domains in estimating fraud
risks and compare them to our approach.
Structured Risk Analysis (SRA) is a method to help organisations take ra-
tional steps to improve their information security [10]. The approach calculates
the actual risk from system vulnerabilities and service threats, and relies on
user-defined qualitative risk metrics. While the process is described very clearly,
the main concerns are the required user inputs and manual computation, and a
lack of visualisation of results.
CORAS is another model-driven SRA [16] with guidelines and steps to per-
form the assessment [1]. CORAS has eight steps, four of them focussing on
context-understanding, and the other four focussing on risk identification, esti-
mation, evaluation, and risk treatment. A software tool represents the context
visually, including unwanted incidents and possible treatments of the risks. Also
CORAS relies on expert input to understand the context and the risk analy-
sis steps, and the risk estimation relies solely on manual computation of risks,
making it difficult to apply for iterative risk analysis with changing context infor-
mation. This is especially relevant for e-services that are continuously developed
and deployed.
Factor Analysis of Information Risks (FAIR) is yet another SRA that takes
different risk factors into account [6]. It qualitatively estimates the impact of
different variables, but it also relies on expert knowledge to estimate the risk.
In contrast to these approaches, our approach supports automated calcula-
tion and visualisation of risks to facilitate informed decision making, and an
easy exploration of potential valuations of factors deemed relevant for a given
scenarios, for example, the likelihood of success, the skill level of a fraud agent,
etc. This is achieved through pre-computation of risk factors to estimate the
potential risk, and through visualisation of analysis results. These factors are
especially beneficial when expert inputs are incomplete.
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Table 1. Concepts and Notations, all mutually exclusive.
Symbol Definition
Fe Fraud enabler
Fagent Fraudster who acts as an
agent
Fthreat A fraud threat i.e., combi-
nation of Fagent and Fe
Tasset Targeted asset direct or in-
direct
Frisk Combination of a Fthreat
and Fe that could affects
Tasset
SLi Skill level of an entity i
SecLi Security level of an entity i
Symbol Definition of Sets
A Actors = H ∪O
B Actions of actors
C Communication media = N ×R×N
E E-service connections and interac-
tions
H Human actors
I Infrastructures
N E-service nodes = A ∪B ∪ I ∪ Y
O Organisational actors
Y Assets (service, income, credential,
money)
R Relations, e.g., agreement, partOf,
possesses, communication
Overall, FRE is not designed to substitute the risk assessment process of
well-established SRAs, but complements them through automatic computation
of risks from pre-computed likelihood values, visualising the analysis results to
be understandable by decision makers and supporting iterative risk estimation
when the context of threat agents and defenders is changing.
3 Baseline: Threat Scenarios and Risk Model
We now present our methodology motivated by the related work on risk analysis,
specifically on risk estimation. We define the concept of threat scenarios in e-
services and identify the factors or variables influencing fraud risk of e-services,
followed by the risk metrics for impact and likelihood. Table 1 introduces some
terms used throughout this paper.
3.1 Threat Scenarios in E-services
Models are widely used to represent software systems, business models, and ser-
vices to enhance understanding and communication between different stakehold-
ers [5]. An e-service model em ⊆ N×C describes the target of assessment (ToA)
using nodes and interactions between nodes [17].
For instance, the IP-based Private Branch Exchange (IP-PBX) service we
consider in Section 5 is an e-service in the Telecom industry that delivers call
and data services using the Internet. IP-PBX switches Voice Over IP to pub-
lic switching telephone network. The conceptual model of an IP-PBX system
contains independent actors, infrastructure, assets, and different types of con-
nections, some of which are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. Examples of nodes and connections in the IP-PBX case
Nodes actors (Telecom operator, company, employees, administrators of IP-
PBX), infrastructure (IP-PBX), assets (call, data, call forwarding ser-
vice)
Connections 〈company, agreement,Telecom operator〉, 〈employees, partOf, company〉,
〈company,possession, call service〉, 〈employees, communication, IP-PBX〉
A fraud agent is a person or a group of organised actors who aim to gain a
benefit by committing fraud. A fraud enabler is an entity with a potential weak-
ness that enables a fraud to happen when exploited by a fraud agent. A fraud
threat is the combination of a fraud agent and one or more fraud enablers. The
threat targets an asset, and its likelihood contributes to the fraud to happen.
These concepts are originally taken from Dubois et al. [4] and adopted for the
context of e-service models [18]. In this paper, we assume the list of threat sce-
narios to be identified from the model using pattern-based risk identification [14,
18], an efficient technique to quickly assess threats in systems.
In e-service models, a fraud enabler is an actor, an action, an infrastructure,
or a communication medium, a fraud threat Fthreat is (Fagent, Fenabler, Tasset),
with Fagent ∈ A, Fenabler ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C ∪ I, and the target asset Tasset ∈ Y ×
[0, 1]×A, which has an owner and a likelihood of success.
3.2 Risk Factors
Risk factors describe behaviours of entities in an e-service model, and capture
the likelihood of a threat scenario to succeed and contribute to an actual risk.
To estimate the risk of a threat scenario, we analyse fraud threat scenarios and
the behaviours of model entities.
Skill level SLi defines the capability of a fraud agent to exploit a fraud en-
abler, resulting in a risk, or of a defender to counter a possible threat. Depending
on the actor, the skill level can be basic, intermediate, or high.
Noticeability is a property of an action to indicate whether a threat scenario
can be identified immediately at the time when a fraudster commits it, and can
be noticeable or unnoticeable. Time-dependent actions are noticeable within a
certain time limit, but time-independent actions require additional effort from
the defenders to be noticeable, otherwise it will stay unnoticeable. For example,
paying a contract fee is a time-dependent action that is required to be paid with
in a week or a month. This action is noticeable after a week or a month.
Security Level SecLi describes the level of protection from a threat for
technical entities in the model, and can be secure, not secure, or unknown. For
example, the communication between a customer and a service provider using
an uncertified communication medium is not secure.
Resource estimates the required resources to commit a fraud or defend
against it. In this paper, we assume resources to be constant and they play no
role in risk estimation, but could easily be added as another value.
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3.3 Risk Metrics
A risk is defined as Frisk = impact× likelihood, leading to qualitative risk metrics
for fraud against e-service assets. Assets can be direct like service and income
generated by the service, or indirect, like credentials and personal identities.
The impact against direct assets is calculated based on the damage to that
specific service in terms of asset value. The impact against indirect assets is
calculated based on its contribution for the damage of direct assets. For example,
when a credential has a direct relation to a direct asset, the asset value of the
credential is the same as that of the asset. Otherwise, the contribution does not
have impact to the direct asset. Based on asset value x and agreed amounty of
the overall asset value, we compute impact:
Impact(x, y) =

VeryHigh if x ≥ 4/5y
High if 3/5y ≤ x <4/5y
Medium if 2/5y ≤ x < 3/5y
Low if 1/5y ≤ x <2/5y
Negligible if x < 1/5y
The likelihood of a fraud agent to succeed in exploiting a threat is calculated
using the risk factors of fraudsters and defenders. These include the SLf , SLd,
SecLi, noticeability, and resources. Assuming that the required resources are
constant, the likelihood varies depending on the target of the threat. For a threat
(a, e, (t, p, o)) with fraud agent a, enabler e, and targeted asset t, likelihood of
success p, and owner o, there are three cases to consider based on the enabler:
Likelihood((a, e, (t, p, o)), d) =

SLf→d if e ∈ A
SLf→d ∗ noticability if e ∈ B
SLf→d ∗ SecLi if e ∈ I ∪ C
where SLf→d is the skill level of fraudster Fagent against the skill level of the
defender d, which can be an actor, infrastructure, or communication medium. If
the enabler is an actor, the likelihood depends on SLf→d, which is computed by
SLf→d =

Likely if SLf > SLd
Possible if SLf = SLd
Unlikely if SLf < SLd
If the enabler is an action, the likelihood depends also on the noticeability. Fi-
nally, if the enabler is an element of the infrastructure or communication media,
the likelihood depends on both SLf→d and the enabler’s security level SecLe:
SecLe =

Likely if e is not secure
Possible if e is not known
Unlikely if e is secure
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Fig. 1. The Fraud Risk Estimation architecture (the boxes indicate the framework
components and the arrows indicate sequences.
4 The Fraud Risk Estimation Framework
The Fraud Risk Estimation framework (FRE) analyses the possibilities of threats
against e-services to succeed, through computing the potential impact, calculat-
ing the overall risk, and visualising the analysis results. Together, these are the
crucial elements to assess the huge number of threat scenarios an e-service may
face, and to enable informed decision making. In this section, we present the
FRE framework and the algorithms applied, as well as a prototype tool.
4.1 The FRE Architecture
The architecture of FRE enables risk estimation by pre-computing the possible
variables for missing values. In other words, FRE automates the risk estima-
tion process to enable informed decision making. The high-level architecture is
shown in Figure 1. The process of FRE, as shown in Figure 2, is a three-stage
process based on input management, risk calculation (impact and likelihood
calculations), and the visualisation of the computed risks.
The input management provides the necessary data to perform the risk esti-
mation as discussed in Section 3: an e-service model to assess, a list of identified
threat scenarios, and risk factors. The list of fraud threats contains fraud agent,
fraud enabler, and targeted asset, the risk factors indicate the possibility of a
threat scenario to succeed in producing a potential risk (Section 3.2), and the e-
service model is a description or representation of the system with nodes (human
and organisational actors, actions and infrastructure and assets) and interactions
(communications, payment transactions and value exchanges including the cor-
responding asset values), similar to those developed by Yesuf [17, 18].
Based on these inputs, the automated computation performs an impact anal-
ysis, likelihood computation, and risk calculation. The impact analyser computes
the impact of a threat scenario based on the agreement between the service
provider and the user, in which the user agrees to pay a certain amount of fee
for the service (in this case the affected asset). Using the measure for impact
described in the previous section, the impact analyser compares the asset value
against the agreed asset value and produces an estimated impact, ranging from
negligible to high impact, resulting in a list of threat scenarios and their impact
value. In parallel, we pre-compute the likelihood of a threat scenario based on
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Fig. 2. The process in FRE.
Algorithm 1 Impact computation
1: procedure computeImpact(t, maxT ) . Threat t, max threshold maxT
2: assetV alue← t.getAssetV alue
3: if assetV alue ≥ 0.8 · maxT then
4: impact← 5
5: else if assetV alue ≥ 0.6 · maxT & assetV alue< 0.8 maxT then
6: impact← 4
7: else if assetV alue ≥ 0.4 · maxT & assetV alue< 0.6 maxT then
8: impact← 3
9: else if assetV alue ≥ 0.2 · maxT & assetV alue< 0.4 maxT then
10: impact← 2
11: else
12: impact← 1
13: return impact/5 . divide by 5 to interpret impact between 0 and 1
Algorithm 2 Compute likelihood
1: procedure computeLikelihood(t, rf) . Threat t, risk factor rf
2: fe← t.getFraudEnabler
3: SL← compareSkillLevel(rf.getSLF , rf.getSLD)
4: if fe = eservice.ACTOR then
5: likelihood← SL/3
6: else if fe = eservice.ACTION then
7: u← rf.getUnnoticeability
8: likelihood← (SL× U)/6
9: else
10: SecL← rf.getSecurityLevel
11: likelihood← (SecL× SL)/9
12: return likelihood
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Algorithm 3 Calculate risk
1: procedure CalcRisk(ts, rf , maxT ) . List of Threats ts, risk factor rf
2: for t in ts do
3: impact← computeImpact(t,maxT )
4: likelihood← computeLikelihood(t, rf)
5: risk ← impact× likelihood
6: return listOfRisks
Algorithm 4 Visualise risk
1: procedure GraphVisualizer(rs, rf) . List of Risks rs, risk factor rf
2: set Y axis . values between 0 and 1
3: for i= 0; i< rs.size(); i + + do . adding coordinates for all risks
4: xi.impact← r.impact .
5: xi.likelihood← r.likelihood
6: xi.risk ← r.risk
7: addbargraph(xi) . addX − axisxi three-level bar graph
8: return listOfRisks
one or more risk factors depending on the nature of the threat scenario and
considering the three cases described in the previous section.
Based on the results of the impact analyser and the pre-computed likelihoods,
the risk is calculated as their product with a value in the interval [0, 1]. The
output of this component is a list of threat scenarios with their associated risks.
The graph visualizer presents these analysis results in different ways to support
and enhance an informed decision making. It currently presents the calculated
risks either as a single threat scenario or for the whole list of threat scenarios.
For a single threat, the graph visualizer presents the corresponding risk in a
graph for all possible combinations of risk factors pre-calculated in the likelihood
pre-computation. For instance, if the target of the threat is an actor action, the
risk calculation is based on the skill level of the fraud agent, the skill level of the
defender, and the action’s noticeability. Based on the possible values, the risk
values for relevant combinations are shown in a graph. Both presentations of risk
values provide a range of tweaks to observe a high-level overview for potential
risks on an e-service and more specifically the risk of a threat scenario to succeed.
Algorithms 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the pseudo-code for implementing the FRE
architecture components described in Section 4.1, including impact analysis,
likelihood computation, risk calculation, and graph visualisation.
4.2 Prototype Implementation
We have developed a stand-alone prototype3 of FRE, shown in Figure 3. As
mentioned in the previous sections, the inputs for FRE are a list of threat sce-
narios and an e-service model. The prototype takes only an e-service model as
3 https://github.com/ahmedyesuf/FraudRiskEstimator/wiki
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Fig. 3. Setting up risk factors in the FRE prototype.
input, and identifies threat scenarios from the model using pattern-based risk
identification [14, 18]. Each identified threat contains the information described
in Section 3 about the targeted asset, fraud enabler, affected actor, and potential
fraudster.
Risk calculation is performed in two ways: for an individual threat scenario
with all possible pre-calculated likelihoods, or for all threat scenarios with a given
combination of risk factors, which we call slider inputs. These sliders allow an
analyst to quickly change values of all variables, inspired by sliders in tools used
in analysing MRI scans, where doctors do not look at the individual images, but
quickly slide through the stack and look for discontinuities and rapid changes.
Based on chosen slider position, the calculated risks are visualised using
graphs. The graph for individual threats as shown in Figure 4 helps to observe
the risk factors that result in a threat scenario being above or below a certain
risk level. The overview graph for all threat scenarios shown in Figure 5 helps
to observe how many of the threat scenarios are found to be above or below
a certain risk level given the specific combination of slider inputs. Both ways
of presentation remarkably increase flexibility of displaying analysis results, and
improve the process of an informed decision making.
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Fig. 4. Visualisation of possible risks for a single threat.
5 Case Study and Validation
We now apply the FRE framework to a case study from an e-service domain,
namely a telecommunication service [17], and evaluate the performance of the
FRE tool.
5.1 A Telecommunication Case Study
Consider a company that wants to use an IP-based Private Branch Exchange (IP-
PBX) system in their communication system, and has created a post-paid con-
tract with a Telecom service provider.
A postpaid contract is a type of service contract where users have to pay
fees within a certain period of time, in this case every month, based on the
usage of the IP-PBX service by the users of the company. Employees of the
company are the main users of the IP-PBX system with an administrator to
maintain and manage their services. Some of the IP-PBX services include call
forwarding, call services (internal and external), and remote connections to the
PBX system. An employee can use an IP-PBX service to communicate with
internal or external parties, or to connect to the IP-PBX system remotely to
get the same service if the feature is granted by the administrator. The service
provider has the responsibility to transfer the calls and other types of services
to the intended destination. For that, the service provider is supposed to create
agreements with other service providers.
Threat scenarios. In this case study, different threat scenarios can be identified
due to social, technical, and other weaknesses of the entities of the case study. To
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Fig. 5. Visualisation of possible risks for all threats.
identify them, we have used the fraud threat model designed by Yesuf [18] that
provides us with recurrent problems occurring in most cases of e-service fraud.
Fraud threats include impersonation of actors, time-interval misuses, usage of
services beyond the expected limit, invisible collusion, insecure communication,
and exploitation of infrastructure vulnerabilities. There are more than 31 possi-
ble threat scenarios identified in this cases study. The following are some of the
threat scenarios from each threat model:
– Impersonation of employees to get remote credentials so a fraudster can use
it to access the IP-PBX system; affected asset: remote credential; asset value:
same value as direct assets with call and data service.
– Impersonation of IP-PBX admin to get admin credentials so a fraudster
can use calling, administrating and maintain IP-PBX system; affected asset:
admin credentials; asset value: the same or more than the asset value of
calling, administrating and maintaining IP-PBX system;
– A fraudster pretends to deliver maintenance work to the Company so that
the fraudster can get company call service and data service; affected asset:
call service; asset value: the same or less than the contact fee between the
service provider and the company;
– Unpaid service payment by the company for the services from the service
provider; affected asset: service provider’s contract fee; asset value: contract
fee;
– Invisible collusion of employees of the company and the other service provider
to increase the income of the other service provider which affects the main
service provider’s income; asset value: income of service provider; asset value:
income of the main service provider.
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Risk estimation. For the IP-PBX case study, the FRE framework computes and
visualises impact, likelihood, and impact for the threat scenarios identified. We
now discuss some of the threats.
The first case is the exploitation of remote credentials through an employee to
establish calls. The remote credential is an indirect asset with a direct relation to
the impact of call services. Thus, the impact of exploiting the remote credential is
as big as the asset value of the call services. Assuming that call services account
for 50% of the contract agreement, the impact of this threat is identified to be
high.
Calculating the likelihood requires to identify the fraud enabler of the threat
scenario, in this case an employee (actor). When the fraud enabler is an actor,
the likelihood is calculated by comparing the skill level SLf of the fraud agent
and the skill level SLd of the defender, which could be the company or the
service provider. Since the skill level is difficult to assess, FRE pre-calculates the
risk for all possible combinations of skill levels. The likelihood pre-calculation
algorithm, for example, computes the likelihood to be intermediate if both SLf
and SLd are intermediate. This results in risk of 0.8× 0.66 = 0.52. As there are
three possible values of skill level (basic, intermediate and expert), in total, FRE
precomputes 9 different risk values that will be presented in a graph.
The second fraud we consider is enabled by maintenance work, which is an
action. The risk factors for an action are its noticeability and as before skill levels
of the fraud agent and defender, SLf and SLd, respectively. The action can be
noticeable or not, so FRE pre-calculates 18 risk values.
For a fraud agent with intermediate skill level, an expert defender, and an
unnoticeable action, the likelihood of the fraud agent to succeed is unlikely, due
to a computed value of (1 × 2)/6 = 0.5. Getting the company’s call service ac-
cess credential is worth the contract agreement, for which the impact is very high
(=1.0). The risk is therefore 0.5× 1 = 0.5. This indicates that even though the
impact is very high, the risk would be reduced by having good defense mecha-
nisms. The risk can even be reduced further by increasing the noticeability of
this kind of actions, for instance, requesting identity cards from the maintenance
workers before allowing entrance.
The same calculations are performed for all threat scenarios. The resulting
graphs for the IP-PBX case are shown in Figure 5.
5.2 Experiment: Performance Validation
The models generated for real world scenarios from different domains can be
expected to become fairly large. To assess the scalability of the FRE framework
when analysing large models, we now evaluate its computational performance.
The two FRE components that contribute to the computation are the risk
calculator and the graph visualiser; the other components are inputs contributing
to these components. The input for testing is a list of threats identified in the case
study. To simulate the increased number of threats and observe the performance,
we created larger models from the case study threats, and observed the response
for several iterations. Figure 6 shows the test results, averaged over the iterations.
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Fig. 6. The computational performance of FRE framework
The test result shows that the analysis time increases linear in the number of
threats. The risk calculation takes insignificant time compared to the visualisa-
tion, since the computations in the former are relatively straightforward, while
the visualisation uses an external graph library requiring more resources. Over-
all, for the objective of estimating risks for preventive measures, the prototype
can accommodate the increased number of threat scenarios.
6 Discussion
Informed preventive measures on e-service fraud are strongly dependent on the
analysis of possible threat scenarios on the target of the assessment and esti-
mating their potential risks. The FRE approach enhances the risk analysis and
estimation by providing an automated computation of risks from a given list of
threat scenarios, visualisation the analysis results and supports repeated analysis
when the context of the threat scenarios is changing.
The FRE approach leverages qualitative risk metrics to compute the impact
and compute the likelihood of threat scenarios. This provides a number of advan-
tages. It is impossible to compute absolute risk factors for new or revised version
of an e-services, as there are limited input data about the risk factors beforehand.
Pre-computing risks requires threshold values for risk factors of threat scenarios,
and having these facilitates the analysis of risks based on possible combinations
of risk factors. Thus, using qualitative risk metrics the FRE approach enables
the automation of risk calculation and visualisation of analysis results.
Another strength of the FRE approach is its scalability. As the evaluation in
the previous section shows, the response time increases linearly in the number of
threats, meaning that also large models can be analysed in short time. This is an
important factor for integrating FRE in a continuous risk assessment approach.
The FRE approach takes the e-service model as input, and uses it to obtain
data of threshold values which uses to compute the impact of threat scenarios.
Estimating the Risk of Fraud against E-services 15
This does not mean that the risks computed by FRE are dependent on the e-
service model, rather by providing the impact threshold as an input, it is possible
to make the FRE approach independent from requiring e-service models as an
input. The FRE approach currently targets e-services only due to the fact that
our risk factors and metrics are produced from the perspective of the e-service
domain. Yet the FRE approach can easily be extended to other domains by
modifying and adding risk factors based upon the characteristics of relevant
threat scenarios.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
E-services are characterised by rapid development, and continuous improvement
and deployment. Designing and implementing a system or a service requires to
perform risk analysis. Considering the characteristics of e-services, it is crucial
to perform risk analysis and estimation automatically to support the decision-
making process. In this regard, we propose the FRE approach to automatically
compute risks from a list of threat scenarios, and to visualise the risks.
Fraud Risk Estimation remarkably reduces the time spent in computing risks
using manual and traditional approaches by pre-computing the possible risk
factors for threat scenarios. This allows risk analysts to perform iterative risk
analysis by changing the context of threat scenarios within a very little amount
of time.
Factors for which no estimates are available, or are considered to be un-
trustworthy, FRE introduces variables and computes the risk by making these
variables assume all possible values. For these variables, we introduce sliders that
allow an analyst to quickly change values of all variables. Sliders are inspired by
those used in tools for analysing MRI scans, where doctors do not look at the
indvidual images, but quickly slide through the stack and look for discontinuities
and rapid changes.
In general, as cybercriminals are always coming up with numerous ways of
committing fraud and attacks, security risk analysis needs to be supported with
automated approaches to prevent security and fraud risks before it happens.
Fraud Risk Estimation enables this approach. We are currently working with
experts from different domains on applying FRE to case studies from their do-
main, in order to incorporate different risk factors for other types of threat
scenarios.
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